A Definition of 'Values'
Domain: Philosophy/ethics
Context: The assessment of importance or moral significance
Our values concern those things we regard as having ultimate importance, significance, or worth. More abstractly, the term often refers to a set of principles, standards, or beliefs concerning these things of ultimate importance.
Typically there are many things that an individual values, and among these some will be more highly valued than others. For this reason, philosophers have sometimes spoken of "value systems".
The relative importance of these values often varies to some degree according to the prevailing circumstances of life, with those things valued which cannot readily be obtained taking on greater significance (and hence acquiring greater value), while those things which are readily available may be taken for granted (thereby becoming less valued).
As one might suppose, values and goals are intimately related. Those things highly valued, if not readily available, will usually be pursued as ends if circumstances permit this. Over time, and with greater maturity, the relative importance of those things valued can more justly be weighed, and are less apt to fluctuate in value with changing circumstances. With this clearer understanding, one of the most important roles of values in life emerges: to provide a set of governing standards in light of which all of the goals of life may properly be set and prioritized.
This role has been nicely described by E. F. Schumacher in his book Small is Beautiful:
"All human activity is a striving after something thought of as good. This is not more than a tautology, but it helps us to ask the right question: 'Good for whom?' Good for the striving person. So, unless that person has sorted out and coordinated his manifold urges, impulses, and desires, his strivings are likely to be confused, contradictory, self-defeating, and possibly highly destructive. The 'centre,' obviously, is the place where he has to create for himself an orderly system of ideas about himself and the world, which can regulate the direction of his various strivings."
Unfortunately, we have just concluded a century in which fundamental values were assaulted as never before. This was basically aconsequence of the collision of religion and science. Religion came to be regarded by many as a collection of folktales, of a piece with, say, the mythology of the Greeks. Yet science doesn't deal with issues of value, and indeed some Positivists went so far as to argue that such issues are sheerest nonsense. Etienne Gilson summed up the situation as follows:
"The growing interest taken by men in the practical results of science was in itself both natural and legitimate, but it helped them to forget that science is knowledge, and practical results but its by-products. . . . Before their unexpected success in finding conclusive explanations of the material world, men had begun either to despise all disciplines in which such demonstrations could not be found, or to rebuild those disciplines after the pattern of the physical sciences. As a consequence, metaphysics and ethics had to be either ignored or, at least, replaced by new positive sciences; in either case, they would be eliminated. A very dangerous move indeed, which accounts for the perilous position in which Western culture has now found itself."
This phase of confusion regarding metaphysics and ethics has effectively now come to an end with the work of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Brand Blanshard, and Thomas Hurka among others; yet there is tremendous cultural inertia behind the ideas that led to this confusion in the first place, and many, perhaps most, are still confused. The disastrous result is that ours remains a culture of individuals without a "center" properly grounded in values.
Related Topics at EP
Related topics may be found in our Field Guide to Philosophy
